79 lines
3.3 KiB
Plaintext
79 lines
3.3 KiB
Plaintext
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#
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# Configuration for the OTP module.
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#
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# This module allows you to use various handheld OTP tokens
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# for authentication (Auth-Type := otp). These tokens are
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# available from various vendors.
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#
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# It works in conjunction with otpd, which implements token
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# management and OTP verification functions; and lsmd or gsmd,
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# which implements synchronous state management functions.
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# otpd, lsmd and gsmd are available from TRI-D Systems:
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# <http://www.tri-dsystems.com/>
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# You must list this module in BOTH the authorize and authenticate
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# sections in order to use it.
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otp {
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# otpd rendezvous point.
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# (default: /var/run/otpd/socket)
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#otpd_rp = /var/run/otpd/socket
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# Text to use for the challenge. The '%' character is
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# disallowed, except that you MUST have a single "%s"
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# sequence in the string; the challenge itself is
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# inserted there. (default "Challenge: %s\n Response: ")
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#challenge_prompt = "Challenge: %s\n Response: "
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# Length of the challenge. Most tokens probably support a
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# max of 8 digits. (range: 5-32 digits, default 6)
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#challenge_length = 6
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# Maximum time, in seconds, that a challenge is valid.
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# (The user must respond to a challenge within this time.)
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# It is also the minimal time between consecutive async mode
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# authentications, a necessary restriction due to an inherent
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# weakness of the RADIUS protocol which allows replay attacks.
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# (default: 30)
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#challenge_delay = 30
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# Whether or not to allow asynchronous ("pure" challenge/
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# response) mode authentication. Since sync mode is much more
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# usable, and all reasonable tokens support it, the typical
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# use of async mode is to allow resync of event based tokens.
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# But because of the vulnerability of async mode with some tokens,
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# you probably want to disable this and require that out-of-sync
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# users resync from specifically secured terminals.
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# See the otpd docs for more info.
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# (default: no)
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#allow_async = no
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# Whether or not to allow synchronous mode authentication.
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# When using otpd with lsmd, it is *CRITICALLY IMPORTANT*
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# that if your OTP users can authenticate to multiple RADIUS
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# servers, this must be "yes" for the primary/default server,
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# and "no" for the others. This is because lsmd does not
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# share state information across multiple servers. Using "yes"
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# on all your RADIUS servers would allow replay attacks!
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# Also, for event based tokens, the user will be out of sync
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# on the "other" servers. In order to use "yes" on all your
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# servers, you must either use gsmd, which synchronizes state
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# globally, or implement your own state synchronization method.
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# (default: yes)
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#allow_sync = yes
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# If both allow_async and allow_sync are "yes", a challenge is
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# always presented to the user. This is incompatible with NAS's
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# that can't present or don't handle Access-Challenge's, e.g.
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# PPTP servers. Even though a challenge is presented, the user
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# can still enter their synchronous passcode.
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# The following are MPPE settings. Note that MS-CHAP (v1) is
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# strongly discouraged. All possible values are listed as
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# {value = meaning}. Default values are first.
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#mschapv2_mppe = {2 = required, 1 = optional, 0 = forbidden}
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#mschapv2_mppe_bits = {2 = 128, 1 = 128 or 40, 0 = 40}
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#mschap_mppe = {2 = required, 1 = optional, 0 = forbidden}
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#mschap_mppe_bits = {2 = 128}
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}
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